Clinton, Trump and the South Caucasus

Of course, the question posed in the title is, to say the least, a little naive. First of all, the Caucasus, and even the South Caucasus, does not exist as a single political space. And there are three countries (the republics of the Russian Federation we will, for the moment, leave out of the equation) whose interests often do not only not coincide, but often run against one another.

This article was originally published in Russian by

newsgeorgia.ge

***

Of course, the question posed in the title is, to say the least, a little naive. First of all, the Caucasus, and even the South Caucasus, does not exist as a single political space. And there are three countries (the republics of the Russian Federation we will, for the moment, leave out of the equation) whose interests often do not only not coincide, but often run against one another.

Moreover, the countries of the South Caucasus have radically different positions on questions of regional security – which is logical, given the weighty experience of history in the region. The political guidelines of these countries are completely different.

Georgia, in some fashion, with both spurts and setbacks, continues to move along a path of Euro – Atlantic integration, and the probability of the reversal of this tendency is practically equal to 0.

The Euro – Atlantic path is a conscious choice made by the vast majority of the population of Georgia. The reorientation in the national consciousness occurred on the night of April 9, 1989, when Soviet troops brutally crushed protests on Rustaveli Avenue. The later wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia only strengthened this choice. And the war of August 2008, which was followed by the ‘recognizing’ of the occupied territories as ‘independent states’ put a big, fat stamp on the relationship between Georgia and the Russian Federation.

However, even after all these events, any mainstream political figure in Georgia can not risk to be too ‘pro – Western.

Undoubtedly, there are forces in Georgia which openly declare the need for closer relations with Russia. Others even rally for joining the Eurasian Union. However, these are politically marginal groups. And even the frankly and unapologetically pro – Russian Nino Burjanadze is not entirely decided upon these issues. She would never speak only about integration with Russia, and continues to put forward a thesis of a country with “non – aligned status.”

Today’s Georgian authorities will continue the tactical maneuvering between Moscow and Washington which was begun in 2012, which includes attempting not to annoy Moscow without reason, which, by the way, is also entirely agreeable to the West. What other political forces and individual politicians that are mildly under Moscow’s influence think is entirely unimportant: because in an environment where the majority of the political elite, media and civil society who shape public opinion are pro – Western, not a single government will risk becoming closer with Moscow.


Armenia, despite the obvious costs, continues to remain in the neo – imperial project of the Russian Federation. It has both objective and subjective reasons for this.

The Karabakh conflict and its proximity with Turkey threw one of the formally most pro – Western Soviet republics into the embrace of Russia. In March of 1991, when the Soviet Union was still alive in name, few could have even supposed that one of the five republics who had boycotted the referendum on the status of the Soviet Union (at that time, Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic Republics refused to vote), 25 years later would be a supporter of the neo – imperial aspirations of Russia in the Caucasus.

To say that the Armenians always supported Russia in the South Caucasus is wrong. Perhaps the Russian Empire, yes, but not the Soviet Union, for it was namely Armenia, who had far less resources than both Georgia and Azerbaijan, that starkly resisted the Sovietization of the country.

From the subjective reasons, we could name the convenience of the Russian political model for the ruling elite of Armenia,

One way or another, a fact remains a fact. Today Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

The Russian influence in Armenia is not only enormous – it is total, the proof of which is the recent appointment of a new Premier Minister, who also happens to be the top – manager of one of Russia’s largest companies.

Despite the fact that even amongst the political elite there has appeared an understanding pertaining to the dead-end nature of Armenia’s relationship with Russia, Armenia will be forced to remain a part of the net-imperial project until its logical end.


As concerns Azerbaijan, this country has attempted to achieve its own political agenda, which on one hand is related to and builds off its historical past and heritage, but on another agrees to the politico-economic reality of the region.

In its foreign policy, this approach would seem to be an attempt to balance both the West and Russia. Here, under the term West, I mean not only the USA and Europe, but also Turkey, which is one of the nearest allies of the country and often acts as a middleman, balancing the interests of the West and Azerbaijan.

Its foreign policy is focussed on two issues: a. the sale of its energy resources to the West and b. the settling of the Karabakh conflict. And while Baku has learned to settle the issue of the sale of its resources without Russia thanks to gas and oil pipelines, it has yet to figure out a way to settle the Karabakh conflict without Moscow.

Moreover, the authorities of Azerbaijan understand that if the conflict were to suddenly develop, Moscow would immediately try to destabilize the situation within the country, for which it has retained a number of levers and methods of pressure that have been left oevr since Soviet times.

Based on these facts, one could come to the conclusion that the politics of the country will remain balanced between centers of power in the region.


This is the current situation. But despite the questions of who belongs to what camp and what relationship they have with Moscow, Brussels or Washington, the question of who will be the president of the USA for the next 4 years is undoubtedly important for all three countries.



Let’s start with Georgia.

Donald Trump visited Georgia in April of 2012. He presented his new project, “Trump Tower” in Batumi. The agreement was signed in New York in March of 2011. The billionaire did not invest his own money in the project – the investor and developer of the project was the Silk Road Group, which is connected with a group of Kazakh investors.

Trump merely licensed the project and gave it his personal stamp. During his visit to Georgia, he was awarded with the “Order of Radiance.” He successfully befriended the third president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili.

Hillary Clinton, as the US Secretary of State, also visited Georgia in the period of Saakachvili’s presidency. Her visit to Tbilisi took place two months after Donald Trump’s. Her visit was a part of her general tour of the South Caucasus in 2012.

Of course, few would have then supposed that these two characters would have ended up in a neck and neck run for the presidency of the United States of America.

The Secretary of State’s visit was notable for the fact that resulted in the reaching of an agreement on military cooperation.

And though no official documents were signed, it was namely this visit of the Secretary of State that laid the groundwork for the decision on the Euro – Atlantic integration of Georgia, in addition to the Wales NATO summit decisions.

Another interesting connection of Clinton’s to Georgia is her brothers who had some common business interests connected to the current de facto leader of the country, Bidzina Ivanishvili.

Georgia – US relations are unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of the US presidential elections.

It would be possible to speculate on the subject, “Trump and Russia” or “Clinton and Russia”, but the thing is that the current government is entirely palatable for both Moscow and Washington.

And for that reason, no sudden changes are expected.



As for Armenia…

A majority of Armenian experts would seem to believe that Hillary Clinton would be a more acceptable president of the USA than Donald Trump.

One of the main arguments is that Clinton has secured good relations with the Armenian diaspora since 1991. As the Secretary of State, Clinton has been very actively supporting the process of normalizing relations between Armenia and Turkey, though largely many of her efforts have remained on paper.

Moreover, since the times of Woodrow Wilson, the Armenian diaspora has shared better relations with the Democrats than the Republicans.

And finally, in Armenia, many believe that the fact that Donald Trump has a number of business interests in both Turkey and Azerbaijan may have a negative impact on US – Armenian relations.

So it is no accident that as early as May, representatives of the Armenian Diaspora expressed their support for Hillary Clinton.

It is reasonable to expect that Clinton will continue to try to reduce the extent of Russian influence in Armenia, because tearing Armenia from Russia is altogether impossible. How successful she will be in this endeavor is another question. The Trump administration would try to do the same thing, though this would happen far later in his administration than under hers.

In June of 2012, Hillary Clinton visited Yerevan, where she held negotiations with the president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Nalbandyan.

Naturally, in the course of these talks, they discussed the question of regulating the Karabakh conflict, and relations between Armenia and Iran.

Then, Hillary Clinton called on the Armenian authorities to careful in its relations with Iran, which was under international sanctions. However, this issue is no longer relevant today.

As for the Karabakh conflict solution, it will hardly depend on who will be elected president of the United States of America.

Having read the above paragraphs, one might assume that given how well the choice of Hillary Clinton would work out for Armenia, then Azerbaijan would obviously prefer Trump, but nothing could be further from the truth.



Of course, the business interests of Trump may play a role in his status in Azerbaijan,


but this is unlikely going to be the most important factor. The foreign policy of a country like the USA is defined by institutions on the political level, and not by the personal interests of the president of the United States. Its another issue altogether that many members of the Republican Party of the USA have long – term interests and contacts with Azerbaijan. It’s not a coincidence that a majority of the members of the American “Group of Friends of Azerbaijan” are from the Republican party.

As concerns Clinton, yes, unlike Trumps he does have long – term contacts with the Armenian diaspora of the USA, but it is obvious that Clinton also recognizes the importance of energy projects in the region and understands Azerbaijan’s role in this process. It is namely these projects that she focussed on during her visit to Azerbaijan, and about which she spoke with president Ilham Aliyev and with the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Elmar Mammadyarov.

During her visit, Clinton visited an international exhibition, “Oil, gas, oil production and oil – chemistry of the Caspian.” Of course, she also discussed the issue of Karabakh, with as much success as when she was in Armenia.

Moreover, the beginning of large – scale energy projects in the South Caucasus are indirectly connected to the presidency of her husband, Bill Clinton, who was a good friend of the former president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev. And so the personal factor is present here as well.

And so the question, who is better for the South Caucasus – Clinton or Trump? – is a naive question. And not because it depends on which country you’re talking about.

The United States have been working on their relationships with the countries of the South Caucasus for decades. And while the particular style of approach might change – and that, little – the fundamentals of the relationship are unlikely to.

What is more important here is that we are on doorstep of a new age of a Russia – West standoff. Perhaps, we are already entirely in it. And what is surprising is that this model of affairs is beneficial to both the USA and to Russia. But who is in power doesn’t really matter.

However, one might speculate that in the case of a Trump – victory, then Moscow will have a small period of opportunity. But after this period, Trump it would seem will act more definitively and harshly than would Clinton.

And the most important: the lines of the stand – off between Moscow and Washington will inevitably run through the South Caucasus. And we should be ready for that, even though it might seem like preparing for a tornado or hurricane: we can keep the damages to as few as possible, but it can not be avoided altogether.

***


Gela Vasadze


Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus

ГлавнаяNewsClinton, Trump and the South Caucasus