Putin’s System: Sociologist Igor Eidman on Putin’s Russia

Sociologist Igor Eidman looked into the methods and individuals involved in the administration of the Russian Federation in his new book titled, Sistema Das System Putin. Wohin steuert das neue russische Reich? [Putin’s system. Where is the new “Russian world” being lead?], which has been recently released in Berlin.

This article was originally published in Russian by

Radio Svoboda.

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Sociologist Igor Eidman looked into the methods and individuals involved in the administration of the Russian Federation in his new book titled,

Sistema Das System Putin. Wohin steuert das neue russische Reich?

[

Putin’s system. Where is the new “Russian world” being lead?

], which has been recently released in Berlin.

Eidman, one of the most prominent researchers of ‘Putinism’ as a social and political system, emigrated from Russia to Germany several years ago.

The forward to the book, published in German by the publishing house LUDWIG, was written by Zhanna Nemtsova and Garry Kasparov, and specially for Eidman’s book, journalist Anastasia Kirilenko prepared insets about corruption scandals and Vladimir Putin’s possible mafia connections.

The researcher believes that the historical roots and ideological base for the system of Putinism stem from a loosely – knit fascist movement of the second half of the 20

th

century. Igor Eidman stated in an interview with Radio Liberty that he sees his book as a warning about the threat that this Putinist fascism carries with it. Eidman believes that:

– Western readers don’t understand the depth of the threat stemming from Putin’s regime. Of course, the term ‘Western reader’ is an abstraction, but on average, or better to say based on my impression from the German readership, it [the ‘Western reader’] is in principle content with maintaining a critical and skeptical attitude towards the Putin regime. Only marginal and radical individuals have a positive attitude towards him – ultra-rights and, for some reason, ultra-lefts, which is an ideological contradiction. This is as if on the principle: the enemy of my enemy is… my enemy.

But the greater part of the population of Germany has a critical and skeptical attitude towards Putin’s Russia, as does the greater part of the elite, who don’t understand, however, the degree of threat stemming from Moscow. They take Putin for some unpleasant person, a cruel man, but as a person all the same, a person with whom one can and must have relations, seeing a need to somehow come to an agreement with him.

Putin violated all conventions at some point concluded with the West. A past dictator, Alfredo Stroessner, for instance, set himself up in Paraguay for forty years. Devil only knows what he got up to there: corruption, terror against political opponents, but sort of hermetically, within Paraguay. But Putin is dangerous because he operates in the international arena. . .

For example there’s a very recent incident that took place in Montenegro, which took place already after I had written my book. They’ve released the specific surnames of Russian citizens that prepared terrorist acts and overturned elections. The surnames are very simple, very widespread, like Ivanov and Petrov – typical surnames for undercover work. They say that these people are some sort of ‘Russian nationalists’. Well what sort of Russian nationalists? In Russia they’ve all long been under the all-powerful cover of the FSB. And just think – this is Montenegro after all, not even a country of the former USSR, not a country of the CIS… There was no such audacity, say, under Brezhnev, during the time of the late USSR. Then, terrorists were given aid quietly, arms were sent to European left-radicals via Palestinians. But this was in no way the same sweep as Putin has now…

We can observe two periods in the history of Putin at the post of leader of Russia. In the first period, he lulled, to a certain degree, the vigilance of the Western public – because of this, there was one Putin for the Western public up until the speech in Munich in 2007, and the Western public, taken aback, was unprepared for the other Putin. Many in the West have been swayed by his simple publicity stunts: making an appearance in the German Bundestag, speaking in German. There was a long period of Russian participation in the ‘Big Eight’, on the NATO-Russia Council… and then Putin changed course, and now he’s quite different. But it’s hard for people in the West to understand a person schooled in the KGB.



Russians were frightened, told that if Hillary Clinton came to power, she would start an atomic war against Russia. Do ‘non-Russians’ want war?

– Of course not. I’m thinking not only of Western countries, but Eastern as well; China for example, which is acting much more wisely than Russia. China could simply crush Taiwan with its power, and in present conditions, the USA couldn’t get involved – we’re not longer in that era. But the Chinese don’t do this, because they understand: there will be more problems than achievements if they do this. The temptation, similar to Crimea, doesn’t attract them. I’m not even speaking of Europe, which is, in principle, peaceful. And the USA under Obama demonstrated that they also don’t particularly want to interfere. Without question, there are some small, aggressive countries, like North Korea or Assad’s Syria, but before all else, the threat to the world stems from Putin’s leadership.

I came up with a political concept, which is presented in this book as well – “penitent Chekists”. In Russia, when I was a political consultant, I met natives of the intelligence community among politicians and businessmen.

These are a particular sort of people. Of course, they are all corrupt, but at the same time internally true to their ideals as they conceive of them. And what are they repenting from? In their time, they let power slip away from them, together with the CPSU, and broke their backs with effort: began to get involved in business, in corruption… The bulk of Russian business, including oligarchic, was created under cover of the KGB. And they, the KGB folk, forgot for a time that which had been impressed on them in their youth: that the USSR is a great country with a special mission, which must emerge victorious over its Western enemies, which is called to bring light to all of humanity, having defeated the villainous America, and so on…

Under Putin they, like Putin himself, remember this and began to actively repent and atone for the sins of their youth. They believe, for example, that ‘Krym nash’ (‘Crimea is ours!’) will clear them of their corruption and the betrayal of their ideals. It is precisely because of this that they are extremely dangerous. Putin’s unacceptable conduct is motivated by these motives – the repentance of a former Chekist, but in his case, there is clearly something to be said for loss of a reasonable understanding of reality. This is connected with the fact that a person has spent so many years in power. Vladimir Voynovich says that a few years of absolute power are enough for a leader to lose sensibility. And when a person has been in power for 16 years…

​–

In your book you formulate an answer to the question of why Putin is waging war and capable of waging war, something which, if we leave aside Afghanistan, the communist leadership wasn’t striving to do, especially Brezhnev, who signed the Helsinki Agreement on de-escalation, and actively upheld the concept of the peaceful coexistence of two systems. Why is this man, Putin, ready for war?

– The Putin generation of leaders is the first generation not to have war sprung on them. War took a heavy toll on Brezhnev’s generation, and for those who survived, it became a personal tragedy. And in Brezhnev’s recollection, as his assistants wrote, there was, in particular, the idea of a fix: not to build communism (as Khrushchev had dreamed), but simply not to allow a big war. And at that time, the population still had a sharp sense of this – of sorrow and pain for the tragedy of war. But for Putin and co, war is parades and Victory Day. He doesn’t fear war because he doesn’t understand it and doesn’t feel it.

There is still one more source of Putinist opportunism. Putin is largely still a part of the 90s. He participated in the government then, in criminal, corrupt business, he got accustomed to resolving problems in the style of the ‘90s – impudently, audaciously, with force and threats, with the assurance that, as they say, we’ll get through somehow. The pals he kept company with at that time, and the KGB folk who, together with these pals consisted a united mafia society – that’s how they resolved all their problems. And it’s with this mentality that he approaches the international arena and behaves himself in the exact same manner – bluffs, intimidates, threatens, and constantly lies. Putin treats European, Western leaders like suckers that need to be cheated, duped and intimidated.



Putin knows that he’s not getting any younger. Are the changes in him during recent years connected with the historical figure he’d like to become? Are we dealing with a regime that has stolen all it can handle and is just searching for any way whatsoever to maintain power, acting out teledramas for the population about ‘Jew-Banderists’, Novorossiya, Syria and so on, with the goal of maintaining the support of the electorate – or does Putin still have an internal mission to become a hero?

– I think that both are present. That is, on the one hand, he has some sort of higher purpose, and he views himself among the ranks of the great Russian leaders. But the ranks are peculiar: Ivan Grozny, Stalin… On the Internet, I saw some things developed by the pro-Kremlin youth movement ‘Nashi’ [Our People –

ed.

]: pictures where Putin stands among the ranks of the great Russian Tsars as Vladimir the Restorer. I think they know how to kiss up to their master, and he clearly likes such things. Well, and there’s a second side – his policies work to hold on to power, to take care of tactical tasks, and to manipulating the electorate. And successfully. Remember, not long ago it seemed that the people were turning away from the Putin regime, and sociologists confirmed that the government rating fell at that time… And all this fell apart after the start of the Crimea Saga… Similar things have taken place in history many times before Putin, this is the ‘short victorious war’ effect. History shows that what might become a problem for Putin and the Russian government is if the short victorious war leads to a large, disgraceful, lost war, which would, to a significant degree, undermine the power of the regime.



Putin and Donald Trump might, as you phrased it, ‘


get along’


. What is the likelihood of such a friendship and why is it dangerous?

I can see them coming to some sort of temporary, tactical agreement, detrimental for Ukraine, for example… They might even go so far as some sort of dividing-up of spheres of influence. Something similar would be consistent with Trump’s reasoning, because he’s not an idealist, but rather exceptionally pragmatic, a seasoned businessman. But for all his negative qualities, Trump nevertheless came up under the conditions of a democratic government with rule of law, whereas Putin spent his formative years under the conditions of a bandit-like, criminal government. Trump will expect that Putin will comply with their agreements, whereas Putin has never complied with an agreement, and won’t do so. He complies with agreements only so long as he believes it’s to his benefit. And when Trump understands that he’s being scammed, then their honeymoon will be over. The separation of powers in the USA won’t allow Trump to do anything that contradicts the interests of democracy, peace and good sense, including actions relating to an alliance with Putin.

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